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Abstract 
The completion of online forms is the catalyst for many business and governmental 
processes. However, providing fraudulent information in such forms is pervasive, 
resulting in costly consequences for organizations and society. Furthermore, detecting 
fraudulent responses in online forms is often very difficult, time consuming, and 
expensive. This research proposes that analyzing users’ mouse movements may reveal 
when a person is being fraudulent. Namely, based on neuroscience and deception 
theory, the paper explains how deception may influence hand movements captured via 
the computer mouse. In an insurance fraud context, a study is conducted to explore 
these proposed relationships. The results suggest that being deceptive may increase the 
normalized distance of movement, decrease the speed of movement, increase the 
response time, and result in more left clicks. Implications for human-computer 
interaction research and practice are discussed. 
Keywords:  Human-computer interaction, Fraud, Mouse Movements 
Introduction 
The completion of online forms is the catalyst for many business and governmental processes. However, 
providing fraudulent information in such forms (e.g., online job applications, insurance claims, visa 
applications, etc.) is pervasive in society. For instance, insurance claim fraud (increasingly filled out using 
online forms) is the second largest white collar crime in the United States after tax evasion (Dean 2004), 
resulting in damages from US$80 to US$120 billion per year (Coalition Against Insurance Fraud; 
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Coolidge 2006; Smith 2000). In Quebec, Canada, more than 10% of all car insurance claims were found to 
be fraudulent (Caron and Dionne 1999). The Inspector General for Tax Administration in the US Treasury 
Department reported that fraudulent tax refunds (also increasingly filled out online) exceeded US$3.6 
billion in 2011 (Barnes 2013). With the advent of the Affordable Care Act in the US, experts further predict 
massive increases in tax fraud (Dorfman 2013). While often considered a “victimless crime” (e.g., Morley 
et al. 2006), fraudulent claims cause tremendous costs for organizations, governments and society.  
Despite the deleterious impacts of fraud, identifying and taking action to mitigate its impacts is 
challenging. With millions of claim documents to process and understand, by both businesses and 
governmental agencies, along with fraudulent claims ranging from slight misrepresentations to fully 
fraudulent claims, auditors have long focused on the easy to identify and most egregious instances. 
Traditional methods for identifying fraud can range from automated ratio analysis to human-based 
investigations that can be expensive and slow. Due to the costs, both time and money, associated with 
identifying fraudulent claims, it has not been practical to verify all claims. Likewise, delaying claim 
processing for honest customers until some type of analysis is completed can lead to customer 
dissatisfaction and have reputational costs for the insurer (Picard 1996). Therefore, improved approaches 
for identifying fraudulent claims will have positive downstream impacts on consumers and society.  
One potential efficient and mass-deployable method for detecting fraud is through monitoring people’s 
mouse cursor movements (Valacich et al. 2013). The analysis of mouse movements has been suggested to 
reveal hidden psychological states that are not availed by traditional measures (Freeman et al. 2011), 
including emotional arousal and valence (e.g., Grimes et al. 2013b), cognitive conflict (e.g,. Dale et al. 
2007), and increased cognitive processing (Freeman and Ambady 2011). In a human-computer 
interaction context, research has proposed that deception can cause uncontrollable, yet measurable, 
changes in people’s keystroke dynamics (how one types on the computer keyboard) (Grimes et al. 2013a). 
Although past research has suggested that mouse movements may also be influenced by deception (e.g., 
Valacich et al. 2013), limited research has theoretically developed and empirically validated hypotheses on 
how deception influences mouse movements.  
Drawing on psychological and neuroscience theory, this paper explains and empirically validates how 
deception in online forms influences people’s hand movements, and thereby mouse cursor movements. In 
doing so, this paper answers the following research question: How does fraud in online forms influence 
mouse cursor movements? To answer this research question within a context, this paper focuses 
specifically on fraudulent insurance claims that are completed online—i.e., claims filed by customers to 
report damages to insurance companies for reimbursement. Hypotheses are developed and empirically 
tested using a mock insurance claim processing study. The results of the study indicate that being 
fraudulent while filling out online insurance claim forms is correlated with increases in the normalized 
mouse cursor movement distance (distance that occurs in addition to the required distance to complete 
one’s action), decreases in movement speed, increases in response time, and increases in the number of 
left clicks. 
Brief Literature Review 
Insurance fraud is a widespread type of fraud in online forms. Fraudulent insurance claims cause 
tremendous monetary losses for insurance companies, resulting in increased premiums for other 
policyholders. Fraudulent behavior includes falsification of details to qualify for cover, claims for losses 
that have never really occurred, as well as exaggerated claims or “build-ups” (Clarke 1990). One common 
form of fraud is exaggerating damages to reclaim one’s deductible. Deductibles are often perceived as 
being unfair, and can thus increase the likelihood of fraudulent behavior because the insured may lie 
about the amount of loss to recover the deductible (Cummins and Tennyson 1996; Weisberg and Derrig 
1992). Empirical studies show that higher deductibles lead to the perception that the contract is unethical, 
that claim exaggeration is fair, and fraudulent behavior is less unethical (Miyazaki 2009).  
To mitigate the effects of fraud (e.g., exaggerating claims to recoup one’s deductible), insurance 
companies attempt to audit suspicious claims. Because auditing insurance claims is costly, auditing 
procedures are augmented with information obtained from fraud detection systems, typically using 
various fraud indicators and classification techniques (e.g., Dionne et al. 2009; Schiller 2006). It is 
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therefore crucial for insurance companies to have effective fraud detection systems in place, as a higher 
accuracy in detecting fraudulent claims can substantially reduce the total costs of ex-post monitoring. 
To this end, we propose and test a method for detecting fraud in online insurance claim forms by 
monitoring users’ mouse movements. Mouse movements have been found to give insight into a number of 
cognitive and emotional processes (see Freeman et al. 2011 for a brief literature review) some of which can 
result from deception, including decision conflict (McKinstry et al. 2008; Palmer et al. 2013), cognitive 
competition (Dale et al. 2007; Freeman and Ambady 2009; Freeman and Ambady 2011; Freeman et al. 
2008), emotional reactions (Grimes et al. 2013b; Maehr 2008; Rodrigues et al. 2013; Zimmermann et al. 
2006; Zimmermann et al. 2003), and increased cognitive processing (Freeman and Ambady 2011). More 
specifically, in some studies, mouse movements have been proposed to be directly indicative of deception. 
For example, Valacich et al. (2013) created propositions that explain how mouse movements may be an 
indicator of deception in concealed information tests; the paper, however, did not test the propositions. 
Our research contributes to theory and practice by explaining and empirically validating how mouse 
movements are influenced by deception in online forms.  
Theoretical Development and Hypotheses 
To develop hypotheses that explain how mouse cursor movements are correlated with fraud, we build on 
two axioms of deception (fraud being a subset of deception). First, when being deceptive, people normally 
experience cognitive or moral conflict (Buller and Burgoon 1996; Nunez et al. 2005). For example, one 
may have feelings of hesitation resulting from guilt or fear of being caught. This may cause people to 
question their actions, possibly even reconsidering their behavior while moving the mouse to commit 
fraud (Derrick et al. 2013; Nunez et al. 2005).  
Double checking, reconsidering, hesitating, or questioning actions results in deviations from one’s 
intended movement trajectory. The response activation model (Welsh and Elliott 2004) explains how 
such competing cognitions cause movement deviations. Namely, the model posits that one’s hand 
movements is an aggregate function of all cognitions with actionable potential. Cognitions with actionable 
potential refer to any thoughts, intentions, or other conscious or subconscious cognitions that have even a 
small potential to result in movement (Welsh and Elliott 2004). For example, when moving the mouse to 
commit fraud in an online form, one may have a thought to stop the action due to fear of being caught; or, 
one may have a thought to respond differently (e.g., moving the mouse to select a different option) to 
result in a more believable fraud. Such thoughts have actionable potential, e.g., to stop or to move 
differently.  
The response activation model explains that when a thought with actionable potential enters the mind 
(i.e., is in working memory), the mind automatically and subconsciously starts to program a movement 
response to fulfill that cognition’s intention (Welsh and Elliott 2004). This includes transmitting nerve 
pulses to the muscles to move the hand and realize the intention (e.g., Georgopoulos 1990; Song and 
Nakayama 2008). These nerve impulses ultimately result in hand movements toward the stimulus. 
Namely, if a person had no conflicting cognitions of how to move, one’s mouse trajectory would roughly 
follow a straight line from the movement’s starting position to the end position (e.g., to the input field on 
the online form that is to be selected). However, the competing cognitions due to being fraudulent will 
increase the deviation from this straight line—i.e., the mind programs movement responses toward other 
stimuli with actionable potential. The deviation can be captured through calculating the normalized 
distance or, in other words, the distance that occurs in addition to the minimum distance1 required to 
perform one’s movement.  In summary, we hypothesize: 
H1:  When being fraudulent in an online form, people will exhibit greater normalized mouse cursor 
distance.  
                                                             
1 When people navigate a page, their movements can be split up into segments. Each segment represents an intended 
movement between two points. Endpoints of segment are estimated when a person clicks on an element, stops 
moving the mouse (over 200 ms), or has a drastic change in direction (over a 45 degree change in direction). The 
starting points include the previous segment’s ending point or the mouse’s original location when the page loads. A 
straight line can be drawn between each segment’s starting and ending points, which represents the minimum 
distance required to perform one’s movement.  
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The second axiom of deception that we build on is that deception is a complex cognitive process that 
requires heightened cognitive resources (Carrión et al. 2010). Being fraudulent may entail an individual 
generating false information while minimizing evidence of deception (Derrick et al. 2011). This requires 
individuals to not only generate the deceptive information, but also engage in strategic behavior to 
manage information and image to appear truthful, which overall leads to more cognitive effort and less 
working memory available for other tasks (Buller and Burgoon 1996).  When working memory is 
decreased, people’s reaction times also become slower (Unsworth and Engle 2005). Slower reaction times 
often lead to slower hand movements (see also the Stochastic Optimized-Submovement Model in Meyer 
et al. 1988; Meyer et al. 1990). Namely, when reaction time slows, the brain has less time to program 
corrections to one’s movement trajectory when visually guiding the hand to targets. This results in 
decreased precision in movements or, in other words, greater deviations from one’s intended trajectory. 
One way the brain automatically compensates for this decrease in precision is to decrease the speed of 
movements (Meyer et al. 1988; Meyer et al. 1990). Hand (i.e., cursor) movement speed and precision are 
inversely related (Plamondon and Alimi 1997); when speed is reduced, movement precision is increased 
as the body has more time to perceive and program needed corrections, allowing it to operate optimally 
within the restriction of slower reaction times (Meyer et al. 1988; Meyer et al. 1990). In summary, we 
hypothesize: 
H2:  When being fraudulent in an online form, people will exhibit slower mouse cursor speed. 
By the definition of velocity, if distance increases and people move more slowly, this must be a result of 
taking a longer time to complete the movement (Elert 2014). In addition, when being deceptive, people 
must take time to engage in strategic behavior, such as generating false information, making sure all of 
the facts align, and performing other actions to appear credible (Buller and Burgoon 1996). This extra 
time to perform strategic behavior will increase the overall response time. As a result, we hypothesize:  
H3:  When being fraudulent in an online form, people will take longer to answer. 
Finally, at a higher behavioral level, we predict that when people are providing fraudulent information in 
an online form (and are unaware that they are being monitored), they will engage in more strategic 
behavior to ensure that their responses are plausible (Buller and Burgoon 1996). As a result, people may 
switch between several possible answers in an online context while deciding how to create the most 
plausible answer. For example, in an online chat context, research has shown that deceivers often make 
corrections to their responses as a part of engaging in strategic behavior (Derrick et al. 2013). In a 
mousing context, this behavior results in a greater number of clicks as compared to someone who does 
not change answers. In summary, we hypothesize: 
H4: When being fraudulent in an online form, people will perform more clicks.  
Methodology 
To test the hypotheses, we conducted a laboratory study within the context of insurance claims. 
Specifically, participants had to complete a series of tasks in which they were required to file insurance 
claims—again, insurance claims being a task in which people frequently engage in fraudulent behavior 
(Dionne and Gagné 2002; Miyazaki 2009). To induce variation in fraudulent behavior, we presented half 
of the subjects with an honor code (as moral reminders), which has been repeatedly demonstrated to 
reduce people’s tendency to engage in fraudulent behavior  (Mazar et al. 2008; Mazar and Ariely 2006). 
During each task we captured mouse input.  
Participants 
Fifty-four participants from a large university in Germany participated in the experiment. Each 
participant received class credit equivalent to an hour of class time as compensation for participating in 
the experiment. Sixty-nine percent of the participants were male; the mean age was 30.0 years. Fifty-six 
percent of the participants stated that they have previously claimed damages with insurance companies, 
and six percent had experience in using online claim forms. Table 1 presents an overview of the 
descriptive statistics.  
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Table 1. Description of subjects 
Total subjects 54 General claim experience 56% 
Gender  Online claim experience 6% 
Male 69%   
Female 31%   
Mean age 30.0   
 
Experimental Design and Materials  
Figure 1 provides an overview of the experiment’s procedure: Upon arrival at the lab, participants were 
presented with instructions to complete the experiment (Figure 2). The instructions asked participants to 
claim damages to their car by using an online insurance claim form. As insurance contracts with a 
deductible are often perceived to be unfair (e.g., Miyazaki 2009) and therefore induce fraud, we developed 
an experimental scenario in which participants had a deductible of 600 coins. The initial wealth at the 
beginning of the experiment was 2,000 coins (see Figure 3 for an example of the scenario). Afterwards, 27 
randomly selected participants were presented with an honor code (an established honor/lying 
manipulation). In particular, the participants in the honor code condition had to sign a statement in 
which they declare their commitment to honesty before starting the tasks (adapted from Mazar et al. 
2008). Manipulating the tendency to engage in fraudulent behavior by using an honor code helped to 
ensure to obtain variation in the data (lying vs. not/less lying). To control for experimenter bias or 
demand effects, the participants were tested one-by-one in the lab, where they could input their data 
anonymously (although they could be tracked by the researchers in another room).  
 
Figure 1.  Procedure 
 
After the honor-code manipulation, participants were randomly given six different damage scenarios 
using a repeated-measures design to parse out variability due to subjects. Further, six levels (scenarios) 
assured us to get enough observations for the statistical analysis. Each scenario had a different repair cost 
and a different number of accident damages; though, repair costs and number of accidents were 
corresponding in an equidistant linear order ranging from 0 costs and 0 damages to 2,000 costs and 5 
damages (0/0 2 ; 400/1; 800/2; 1,200/3; 1,600/4; 2,000/5) (see Table 2). The applicability of the 
scenarios was pilot tested with 9 participants using the think aloud method (Jorgensen 1990). To control 
for learning and sequence effects, we randomized the order of the scenarios. Figure 2 shows an example of 
a scenario presented to the participants.   
After presenting each scenario, participants were directed to a Web page containing an online insurance 
claim form. The form consisted of a welcome page, a repair costs input page, and a damage input page (for 
                                                             
2 In Scenario #1 with 0 cost and 0 damage subjects were allowed to commit fraud even though there was no cost and 
damage. 
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indicating the location(s) of the damage, see Figure 3). As we were interested in analyzing mouse cursor 
movements, the pages for entering costs and damage information were designed to require mouse input. 
On the repair costs input page, the participants could report the costs using drop down menus; on the 
damage input page, the participants could mark several damages to the rear end of a car (see Figure 3). 
After completing a scenario, the participants were presented with the next scenario and redirected to the 
Welcome page. The program started tracking the participants’ mouse cursor movements upon visiting the 
repair costs input page, and stopped recording at the end of each scenario.  
After completing all six scenarios, participants were asked to provide demographic information, and were 
debriefed per IRB protocol. 
 
Situation: 
• You have an initial wealth of 2,000 coins. 
• For your vehicle, you purchased an insurance policy with a deductible of 600 coins. In 
other words, if the damage to your car is 1,000 coins, you will be responsible for paying the 
first 600 coins, and the insurance pays the remaining 400 coins. 
• Imagine that recently, you had an accident when backing up into a small parking spot, and 
damaged the rear end of your car. 
• Now, you have to file an insurance claim on the insurance company’s website. 
 
Example: 
• Before the accident, you have an initial wealth of 2,000 coins. 
• The repair of the damage to your vehicle costs 1,000 coins; thus, your wealth is reduced to 
1,000 coins. 
• Assume you file a claim of 1,300 coins. Given your deductible of 600 coins, the insurance 
would pay you 700 coins (1,300 coins – 600 coins).  
• Your final wealth after receiving payment from the insurance company would be 1,700 coins. 
 
Your task: 
• You will be presented with 6 different scenarios, for which you will have to file insurance 
claims. In each scenario, the damage to your vehicle is different. 
o In each scenario, you have an initial wealth of 2,000 coins. The higher your claim, the 
higher the payment from the insurance company. In other words, your final wealth 
depends on the amount you claim from the insurance company.  
o The insurance company has no way of verifying your claims. Also, the amount of your 
claims has no impact on future insurance premiums.  
 
Please note:  
Please make sure that you understand the instructions provided. All answers provided in this study are 
strictly anonymous. 
Figure 2.  Experimental Instructions Sheet (All Instructions Sere in German) 
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Table 2. Scenarios 
Scenario # Repair costs (in coins) Number of accident damages 
1 0 0 
2 400 1 
3 800 2 
4 1200 3 
5 1600 4 
6 2000 5 
 
 
Scenario 3 
You had a damage of 800 coins. 
The following areas have been damaged. 
 
Figure 3.  Sample Scenario (Repair Costs: 800; Number of Damages: 2) 
 
 
Figure 4.  Webpage Sequence 
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Measures 
In each scenario, participants had two opportunities to engage in fraudulent behavior: on the repair costs 
page and on the damage page (see Figure 4). We operationalized fraudulent behavior as the presence or 
absence of a positive difference between the actual repair costs/damage and the reported repair 
costs/damage(s) (for each scenario). Therefore, we defined fraud as a binary variable (1 = fraud; 0= no 
fraud). We operationalized the extent of fraud as the difference between the reported repair 
costs/damages and the actual ones (Repair costs: reported - actual, Damages: reported - actual). On the 
repair-costs page, 42 percent of the observations (out of 255 observations) were fraudulent. Twenty-one 
percent of the observations on the repair-costs page were fraudulent.  
Using Mouse Recorder Pro (Version 2.0.7.0), we captured each x/y position of the mouse cursor and their 
corresponding timestamp, which allowed us to calculate the mousing statistics for each participant and 
scenario. To this raw data, we performed several normalizations. First, we normalized for screen 
resolution. Although this is not necessary because all participants used the same computer screen in this 
study, it is a common practice to facilitate future replication (e.g., Freeman and Ambady 2010). We 
rescaled the x-, y-coordinate pairs to a standard 8 x 6 grid: the x-axis goes from -4 to 4, and the y-axis 
goes from -3 to 3. The mouse’s starting position is mapped at coordinate (0, 0). This maintains the aspect 
ratio of most screens. 
Next, we calculated normalized distance. As participants who claim more must naturally move their 
mouse further (e.g., marking two damages instead of just one), we normalized for distance by calculating 
the minimum required distance to perform a person’s movement and then subtracting this value from the 
person’s actual distance. This statistic is constructed based on users’ actual movements without any 
required knowledge of whether a response is truthful or deceptive. When people navigate a page, their 
movements can be split up into segments. Each segment represents an intended movement between two 
points (e.g., moving the mouse from its current position to a part of a car to select damages). Endpoints of 
segments are estimated when a person clicks on an element, stops moving the mouse (for over 200 ms), 
or has a drastic change in direction (over a 45 degree change in direction). The starting points include the 
previous segment’s ending point or the mouse’s original location when the page loads. A straight line can 
be drawn between each segment’s starting and ending points, which has a distance (this is referred to as 
the minimal distance). One can then calculate normalized distance by subtracting the minimal distance 
from the actual distance of the person’s movements. This results in a statistic that entails only the 
“additional” distance that may have been caused by physiological effects of deception, not from simply 
being required to move the mouse a greater distance to make claims.  
Finally, the system calculated the time taken for each scenario, mouse cursor speed as a function of 
overall distance and time, and left clicks. Table 3 provides an overview of the summary statistics. 
Results 
Manipulation Checks 
Prior to analyzing mouse cursor movements, we performed manipulation checks to ensure that the honor 
code treatment had the intended effect of reducing fraudulent behavior. We found that participants who 
were presented with an honor code indeed showed significantly less fraudulent behavior. On the cost 
page, participants in the honor code condition reported on average 195.23 coins less in repair costs than 
the participants in the baseline condition (t = 3.10, p < .01). The difference in mean reported repair cost 
minus actual repair costs of 220.37 coins was also highly significant (t = 3.41, p < .01). However, on the 
damages page, the means for the absolute damages reported and for the reported damages minus the 
actual damages were not statistically different (t = 1.09, p = .28 and t = 1.58, p = .12, respectively). In 
summary, the honor code effectively reduced the exaggeration of insurance claims when reporting repair 
costs. 
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Table 3. Summary statistics 
Subsample Variable Unit Mean SD p10 p50 p90 
Repair Costs Page Fraud % 43.36     
 Repair Costs: reported Coins 1409.15 683.49 400 1400 2200 
 Repair Costs: rep. - actual Coins 199.77 356.94 0 0 600 
        
Damage Page Fraud % 20.70     
 Damage: reported No. 3.32 1.55 1 3 5 
 Damage: rep. - actual No. 0.30 0.70 0 0 1 
  
Subsample Variable Unit Mean 
Std. 
dev. 
p10 p50 p90 
Repair Costs Page Normalized Distance normalized 4.96 5.11 1.44 3.28 11.49 
 Speed px/ms 0.12 0.07 0.05 0.11 0.21 
 Time ms 16295 18230 4804 10693 34848 
 Left Clicks No. 5.00 2.74 3 5 8 
        
Damage Page Normalized Distance normalized 7.68 3.86 4.34 6.73 12.16 
 Speed px/ms 0.16 0.06 0.09 0.15 0.25 
 Time ms 13690 9224 5725 11223 23726 
 Left Clicks No. 5.40 2.51 3 5 8 
Findings 
We next compare the extent to which claims were different between fraudulent and non-fraudulent cases 
(Table 4).3  In summary, the means of reported damages between the fraudulent (M = 1692.27, SD = 
690.28) and non-fraudulent (M = 1186.81, SD = 593.35) cases where significantly different (t = -6.87, p < 
.01); further, we observed a significant difference in the means of reported vs. actual repair costs between 
the fraudulent (M = 470.65, SD = 400.77) and non-fraudulent (M = -7.64, SD = 55.57) cases (t = -9.19, p < 
.01). On the damage page, we found a significant difference in the means of reported damages between 
the fraudulent (M = 4.40, SD = 1.52) and non-fraudulent (M = 3.03, SD = 1.44) cases (t = -5.72, p < .01); 
further, there was a significant difference in the means of reported vs. actual damages between the 
fraudulent (M = 1.45, SD = 0.85) and non-fraudulent (M = 0, SD = 0) cases (t = -8.39, p < .01). In 
summary, the cases with fraudulent behavior not only significantly exaggerated the actual repair costs, 
but also reported a higher number of damages, which underlines the argument that participants behave 
strategically to ensure that their responses are plausible. 
 
 
 
                                                             
3 Because there were several observations per participant in our study design, it is not reasonable to assume that the 
observations are independent. For this reason we performed linear regressions of y (e.g., repair costs or damages) on 
x (Fraud) with standard errors clustered at the participant level to determine whether the differences are statistically 
significant. This method only assumes that observations are independent between clusters (participants) but not 
necessarily within clusters. The reported t- and p-values thus refer to the linear regression results with standard 
errors clustered for each participant. 
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Table 4. Fraudulent and Non-Fraudulent Cases 
  Fraud   
Subsample Variable Unit 
Mean 
(no) 
Mean   
(yes) 
Mean 
diff. t p < 
Repair Costs Page Repair costs: reported Coins 1186.81 1692.27 505.46 -6.87 0.01 
 Repair costs: rep. - actual Coins -7.64 470.65 478.29 -9.19 0.01 
        
Damage Page Damages: reported No. 3.03 4.40 1.36 -5.72 0.01 
 Damages: rep. - actual No. 0 1.45 1.45 -8.39 0.01 
  
Next, we tested our hypotheses to explore whether mouse movements are correlated with fraudulent 
behavior (Table 5).4 The results are discussed below. 
H1: Normalized Distance—Supported  
In fraudulent cases, participants traveled on average a normalized distance of 5.76 on the repair costs 
page, whereas in non-fraudulent cases, participants traveled significantly less with an average normalized 
distance of only 4.34 (t = -1.97, p < .05). Likewise, on the damage page, participants traveled on average a 
normalized distance of 9.10, whereas in non-fraudulent cases, participants traveled significantly less with 
an average normalized distance of only 7.31 (t = -3.30, p < .01). Thus, consistent with hypothesis H1, 
people exhibited greater normalized mouse cursor distance when being fraudulent. 
H2: Speed—Mixed Support 
On the repair costs page, participants had an average speed of 0.12 px/ms in fraudulent cases compared 
to 0.13 px/ms in non-fraudulent cases. Likewise, on the damage page, participants had an average speed 
of 0.15 px/ms compared to 0.16 px/ms in non-fraudulent cases. Thus, the speed was found to be slower in 
fraudulent cases than in non-fraudulent cases (on both input pages), which is in line with hypothesis H2. 
However, the difference was only significant on the damage page (t = 2.01, p < .05) and not on the repair 
cost page (t = 1.56, p = .12).  
This may be because the damage page occurs after the repair cost page, and therefore participants must 
engage in more strategic behavior to ensure the reported damage locations align with the reported 
damage costs. For example, one must cognitively estimate how much various damage locations would cost 
so that the reported damage locations would coincide with the reported damage costs. Over- or 
underestimating the cost of false damage locations would decrease the credibility of the claim. As this 
activity is more cognitively demanding perhaps than the previous task of reporting the overall damage 
cost, it will result in slower speed consistent with the theory. Future research should explore this possible 
explanation in more detail. 
H3: Time—Supported  
In fraudulent cases, participants took on average 19,519.52 ms on the repair costs page and 16,868.81 ms 
on the damage page to respond. In non-fraudulent cases, participants took on average 13,853.21 ms on 
                                                             
4 As mentioned in the methodology section, we randomized the order of the scenarios to control for learning and 
sequence effects. However, to explicitly analyze if our findings are a consequence of a potential learning effect, we also 
performed empirical tests using the subset of data consisting of only the first observation of every participant (50 
observations). These analyses confirm that our findings are not a consequence of a potential learning effect (see 
Appendix A). 
Moreover, we performed additional statistical tests to analyze whether individual characteristics could have affected 
the results (see Appendix B). We found that there were no statistically significant individual differences between the 
fraudulent and n0n-fraudulent cases. Thus, the different mouse usage between the fraudulent and non-fraudulent 
observations were not likely to be influenced by individual differences. 
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the repair costs page and 12,855.02 ms on the damage page to respond. These difference were both 
significant (t = -2.21, p < .05 and t = -2.65, p < .01 respectively). Therefore, H3 is supported; fraudulent 
cases took significantly longer to respond than non-fraudulent cases.  
H4: Clicks—Supported  
When committing fraud, participants clicked on average 5.69 times on the repair costs page and 7.09 
times on the damage page. When being truthful, participants clicked on average 4.47 times on the repair 
costs page and 4.95 times on the damage page. This difference between fraudulent and non-fraudulent 
cases was highly statistically significant for the repair costs page (t = -3.08, p < .01) and the damage page 
(t = -4.22, p < .01). Thus, consistent with hypothesis H4, we find that fraudulent cases exhibited 
significantly more clicks than non-fraudulent cases. 
Table 5. The Effect of Fraud on Mouse Usage 
  Fraud   
Subsample Variable Unit 
Mean 
(no) 
Mean   
(yes) 
Mean 
diff. t p < 
Repair Costs Page Normalized 
Distance 
normalized 4.34 5.76 1.42 -1.97 0.05 
 Speed px/ms 0.13 0.12 -0.02 1.56 0.12 
 Time ms 13,853.21 19,519.52 5,666.31 -2.21 0.05 
 Left Clicks No. 4.47 5.69 1.22 -3.08 0.01 
        
  Fraud   
Subsample Variable Unit 
Mean 
(no) 
Mean   
(yes) 
Mean 
diff. t p < 
Damage Page Normalized 
Distance 
normalized 7.31 9.10 1.79 -3.30 0.01 
 Speed px/ms 0.16 0.15 -0.01 2.01 0.05 
 Time ms 12,855.02 16,868.81 4,013.79 -2.65 0.01 
 Left Clicks No. 4.95 7.09 2.14 -4.22 0.01 
 
Discussion 
This paper explored the following research question: How does fraud in online forms influence mouse 
cursor movements? Hypotheses were created by building on the response activation model and axioms of 
deception to explain how normalized mouse cursor distance, speed, response time, and left clicks would 
be influenced by fraudulent behavior. The paper then presented an experiment to test the hypotheses in 
an insurance fraud context. The results support all four hypotheses; when being fraudulent in an online 
insurance form, people exhibit greater normalized distance (H1), slower speed (H2), greater time (H3), 
and more left clicks (H4) than when being truthful. We will now discuss possible practical and theoretical 
implications. 
Theoretical Contributions 
This research contributes to theory by explaining how fraudulent behavior will influence users’ mouse 
movements. Although past literature suggests propositions on how deception may influence mouse 
movements (e.g., Valacich et al. 2013), this research is among the first to theoretically derive and 
empirically test specific hypotheses. Building on the response activation model and common axioms of 
deception, we explain how deception will cause competing hand movements that can be measured via a 
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computer mouse. We posit that people may show hesitancy or experience other conflicting cognitions 
with actionable potential when being deceptive. As a result, one’s movement is a function of not only the 
primary intended movement, but also these other secondary movements, which will result in deviations 
from one’s intended trajectory. Furthermore, we explain how fraud, as a cognitively demanding task, will 
result in slower hand movements and more mouse clicks. Hence, this research extends knowledge about 
how fraud and deception influence hand movements, including speed, normalized distance, time, and left 
clicks.  
Second, we introduce and begin validating a novel measurement of human physiological and 
psychological states: mouse movements. The results suggest that human states may be inferred through 
the analysis of mousing and clicking behavior. Aside from the implications for fraud detection, future 
research could explore what other states can be inferred through analyzing users’ mouse movements. For 
example, research could explore how emotions, ease-of-use, or other outcomes influence mousing 
behavior and other interactions with a computer. 
Practical Contributions 
Fraud is ubiquitous and costly in society. As more organizational processes and forms move online, 
detecting deception in these forms and processes is ever more important. This paper proposes a 
methodology for detecting deception in online forms based on how people interact with the form via a 
computer mouse. Namely, this paper explores how being fraudulent influences mouse movement 
behavior. Capturing mouse movements does not require any special hardware on users’ computers; they 
can be collected in a web browser using common and freely available JavaScript libraries such as JQuery. 
Hence, this research provides theoretical sound and validated cues of fraud that can increase 
organizations’ ability to identify possible fraud in online forms without substantial investment. This may 
result in tremendous savings to organizations, customers, and society in general.  
Limitations and Future Research 
Our experiment results are limited to a sample population that uses a computer mouse. However, other 
input devices are also popular such as touchscreens, touchpads, sketchpads, and in-air sensors (the 
Microsoft Kinect® or the LeapMotion®). Much of what is discussed in this paper may apply to these other 
devices; the technology ultimately captures the location of the cursor (which may include a finger) on the 
screen, not characteristics specific to a computer mouse. Further, some of these devices capture more 
sophisticated information than does the computer mouse. For example, a touchscreen can capture the 
diameter of the finger and thereby infer pressure. In-air sensors capture the z-dimension in addition to 
the x- and y- dimensions. Future research should explore how human states can be predicted through 
these other inputs.  
Second, this study identified how being fraudulent in an online insurance form is correlated with users’ 
mouse movements. The study did not explore, however, the efficacy of predicting deception based on 
these mouse movements. Future research should explore this possibility. When predicting deception, one 
should rely on multiple cues (e.g., clicks, speed, time, normalized distance, and other cues) rather than on 
a single cue. Speed, normalized distance, time, and left clicks is not an exhaustive list of features that can 
be calculated from mouse movements. An opportunity exists to explore what other features can be 
extracted and have utility in predicting users’ physiological and psychological responses. Furthermore, no 
deception detection technique is 100% accurate. Thus, when suspicious behavior is identified through 
analyzing mouse movements, follow-up investigations should occur to confirm or disconfirm the 
suspicion.  
Third, future research should extend our results to a broader set of contexts and populations. The primary 
purpose of this experiment was to maximize internal validity. To motivate deception in this controlled 
experiment, several measures were taken that do not reflect real-life, including explaining that the 
insurance company could not verify the claim. We recommend future research to extend the external 
validity of the paper, as generally multiple studies are needed to maximize internal and external validity 
(Dennis and Valacich 2001). Consistent with our theory, we suspect that the results would be amplified 
when the probability of being caught is increased, as people will be more likely to double check, 
reconsider, hesitate, or even question their actions.  
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Finally, our experiment had participants respond to multiple scenarios and clustered the analysis by 
participant to calculate significance levels. In real-world insurance scenarios, organizations normally do 
not have the opportunity to run multiple scenarios with people who submit insurance claims. As an 
alternative approach to understand people’s normal mousing behaviors (and thereby calculate when 
normalized distance, speed, time, and left clicks change), future research can utilize a control-question 
approach—i.e., have people answer several questions that they are likely to answer truthfully to establish a 
baseline. The use of control questions is commonly used in various polygraph-based deception detection 
approaches (e.g., Abrams 1976; Krapohl et al. 2006). 
Conclusion 
This paper explored how being deceptive (i.e., fraudulent) in online forms influences mousing behavior. 
Based on theory relating to deception and the connection between cognition and hand movements, the 
paper posited that the act of deception has physiological and psychological side effects that can be 
measured through the computer mouse at a millisecond precision rate. Namely, when engaging in fraud, 
users travel greater normalized distances, move slower, take more time, and make more left clicks then 
when providing truthful information. These hypotheses were tested in an online insurance fraud 
experiment. The results of the experiment supported the hypotheses and suggest that people do behave 
differently with the computer mouse when committing fraud. Implications regarding the use of mouse 
movements as an objective measure of behavior in research were discussed. Overall, this research has 
implications for creating algorithms in the future that detect deception in online forms as a mass-
deployable, cost-effective method for identifying fraud.  
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Appendix A: Analyses Regarding a Potential Learning Effect 
Table A.1 and A.2 report the results corresponding to Table 4 and 5 in the paper if only the first observation of every 
participant was used.  
 
Table A.1. Comparing Fraud Groups 
  Fraud   
Subsample Variable Unit Mean (no) Mean (yes) Mean diff. t p 
Repair Costs Page Repair costs: reported Coins 1608.57 1980 371.43 -2.28 0.03 
 Repair costs: rep. - actual Coins -14.29 460 474.29 -3.98 0.01 
        
Damage Page Damages: reported No. 4 5.14 1.14 -2.35 0.05 
 Damages: rep. - actual No. 0 1.29 1.29 -6.97 0.004 
 
Table A.2. The Effect of Fraud on Mouse Usage 
  Fraud   
Subsample Variable Unit Mean (no) Mean (yes) Mean diff. t p 
Repair Costs Page Normalized 
Distance 
Normalized 4.97 8.66 3.68 -2.07 0.04 
 Speed px/ms 0.08 0.08 0.00 -0.38 0.70 
 Time Ms 21519.11 34829.93 13310.80 -1.85 0.07 
 Left Clicks No. 5.86 8.07 2.21 -1.62 0.11 
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  Fraud   
Subsample Variable Unit Mean (no) Mean (yes) Mean diff. t p 
Damage Page Normalized 
Distance 
normalized 9.32 13.49 4.17 -2.44 0.02 
 Speed px/ms 0.12 0.10 -0.02 1.04 0.31 
 Time Ms 19882.98 30524.71 10641.70 -3.33 0.00 
 Left Clicks No. 6.53 8.57 2.04 -3.08 0.00 
- The results remain qualitatively unchanged if only the first observation for each participant is analyzed. The 
coefficients of the mean differences remain identical for all mouse variables except Speed on the repair costs 
page (which is, however, not significantly different from zero in both analyses). 
- The magnitude of the coefficients is in most cases similar or even higher compared to the findings presented in 
the (original) Table 6. 
- While several of the presented differences remain statistically significant, some results are not significant 
anymore, which is mainly due to rather small number of observations (only 50 observations if only the first 
observation per participant is used compared to 255 observations if all observations are used). 
 
Appendix B: Analyses Regarding Potential Individual Differences 
across Fraudulent and Non-Fraudulent Cases 
To analyze whether individual characteristics (see Table 2) could have affected the results, we performed statistical 
tests exploring whether these characteristics differ between the fraudulent and non-fraudulent group. The results are 
reported in Table B.1 
 
Table B.1 The Effect of Fraud on Mouse Usage 
 Fraud   
Variable Unit Mean (no) Mean (yes) Mean diff. p  
Gender Percent Male 71% 53% -18% 0.25  
Age Years 30.0 29.3 -0.6 0.80  
General claim experience Percent 51% 67% 15% 0.33  
Online claim experience Percent 0% 20% 20% 0.08  
We find that there are no statistically significant individual differences across the fraudulent and non-fraudulent 
group. Thus, the different mouse usage between the fraudulent and non-fraudulent observations are not likely to be 
influenced by individual differences. 
 
